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IN SECTION 77-7-6(2) WHICH PROVIDES THAT A PERSON 
NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF "INTENTION, 
CAUSE AND AUTHORITY TO ARREST" WHEN THE PERSON BEING 
ARRESTED (DETAINED) IS "ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN THE 
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(ASSAULT); AND 
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ON REHEARING, 
(A) WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCEPTION, i.e., 
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(ASSAULT) "AT THE TIME AVONDET ARRESTED (DETAINED) 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELWOOD E. McFARLAND, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. . Case No. 18352 
SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC., 
Defendant/App[ellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant/Appellant Skaggs petitions the Court for a 
rehearing pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the following reason: 
REASON A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED 
THIS COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT AVONDET (SKAGGS) DID NOT MAKE A PROPER 
ARREST OF McFARLAND SINCE SHE DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-7-6 WHICH REQUIRES 
THE PERSON MAKING THE ARREST TO DISCLOSE HER 
"INTENTION, CAUSE AND AUTHORITY TO ARREST" BECAUSE 
(1) THlS COURT OVERLOOKED THE EXCEPTION TO 
SECTION77-7-6 (AS EVIDENCED BY THE SILENCE IN THE 
COURT'S OPINION CONCERNING IT) WHICH IS SET FORTH 
IN SECTION 77-7-6(2) WHICH PROVIDES THAT A PERSON 
NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF "INTENTION, 
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CAUSE AND AUTHORITY TO ARREST" WHEN THE PERSON BEING 
ARRESTED (DETAINED) IS "ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN THE 
COMMISSION OF OR AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE 
(ASSAULT); AND 
(2) THIS COURT SHOULD RENDER A DECISION, 
ON REHEARING, 
(A) WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCEPTION, i.e., 
WHETHER OR NOT McFARLAND WAS "ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN 
THE COMMISSION OF OR AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE 
(ASSAULT) "AT THE TIME AVONDET ARRESTED (DETAINED) 
HIM, AND 
(B) WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER THIS ISSUE CAN 
BE DECIDED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR WHETHER IT SHOULD 
BE DECIDED BY A JURY ON REMAND. 
1. This Court held as a matter of law that Anita 
Avondet, Skaggs' security officer, did not make a proper arrest for 
assault pursuant to §77-7-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, because she 
did not inform plaintiff/respondent McFarland of her "intention, 
cause and authority to arrest (notwithstanding the fact that.£.!:!!_ 
trial court held as a matter of law that because the arrest was 
transitory (in the process of being committed), whether or not it 
was a proper arrest was a jury question. But, where this court 
err.-.ed was it did not consider the exception to §77-7-6 which is 
set forth in §77-7-6(2), which provides that the requirements of 
"intent ion, cause and authority" to arrest "need not be complied 
with if the person being arrested is "actually engaging in the 
commission of or an attempt to commit the offense (assault) "at the 
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time of the arrest or detention. This exception must be considered 
and decided upon in this case. 
2. Both Appellant and Respondent relied on the trial 
court decision that this issue was a jury question and pursuant 
thereto neither Appellant nor Respondent raised this issue on appeal 
nor did Appellant or Respondent brief or argue this issue on appeal 
and therefore, Appellant should be given an opportunity, in all 
fairness, to brief and argue this issue on rehearing, especially in 
light of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court did not render any 
decision concerning the exception to §77-7-6. 
3. If this court would allow Appellant to brief and 
argue this issue on rehearing, it would realize that it committed 
error and an injustice in ruling as a matter of law that the arrest 
by Avondet of McFarland for assault, under §77-7-6 was not proper 
without rendering any decision concerning the exception ennumerated 
in §77-7-6(2) which waives the requirements of "intention, cause 
and authority to arrest" if the person arrested or detained, 
McFarland, was "actually engaged in the commission of or an attempt 
to commit "an assault at the time of his arrest or detention. 
(A) §77-7-6 provides as follows: 
Manner of making arrest. The person making 
the arrest shall inform the person being arrested 
of his intention, cause and authority to arrest 
him. Such notice shall not be required when: 
(1) There is reason to believe the notice 
will endanger the life or safety of the officer 
or another person or will likely enable the 
party being arrested to escape; 
(2) The erson bein arrest.ed is actuallv 
enga9ed in t e comm1ss1on attempt to 
commit, an offense; or 
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(3) The person being arrested is pursued 
immediately after the commission of an offense 
or an escape. 
(B) §77-7-6(2) waives its own requirement and does not 
require "intention, cause and authority to arrest" if "the person 
being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or an 
attempt to commit an offense." 
(C) There was evidence in the record McFarland struck 
Avondet twice, knocking her down, and that after regaining her 
feet, Avondet produced handcuffs and then McFarland declared "Ok. 
Ok. I'll go back in." (Record p. 95). 
(D) Under similar facts and an almost identical statute, 
the California Supreme Court held there was no requirement to 
inform of "intention, cause and authority to arrest" in State v. 
Beard, 294 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1956) as follows: 
Defendant also contends, however, that the 
officers failed to comply with Section 841 of the 
Penal Code and the arrest was therefore unlawful. 
That section provides: "The person making the 
arrest must inform the person to be arrested of 
the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the 
arrest, and the authorit~ to make it, except when 
the person to be arreste is actually engaged in 
the commission of or an attem t to commit an 
o ense, or is pursue imme iate y a ter its com-
m1ss1on, or after an escape." The record is not 
clear as to just what the officers said to defen-
dant at the time of the arrest and search, and it 
may be conceded that there is some evidence that 
they did not expressly inform him "of the inten-
tion to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest 
and the authority to make it." Since the triai 
court found, however, that defendant was arrested 
while en a ed in the commission of the offense, 
t ere was no v10 at1on o ect1on . 
Id., at 30 (Emphasis added). 
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Thus, the California Supreme Court held that its requirement of 
"intention, cause and authority" was not applicable to the facts of 
the Beard case because the person being arrested (detained) was, at 
the time one would normally be informed, "engaged in the commission 
of the offense." 
In the case at bar, the Utah Supreme Court, has ruled as a 
matter of law that the arrest for assault was improper because 
Avondet did not inform McFarland, at the time he was assaulting her, 
of her "intention, cause and authority" but what the Utah Supreme 
Court overlooked, which is clear from the opinion since there is no 
mention of it, is the exception to §77-7-6 that one need not comply 
with the formal requirements and advise as to "intention, cause and 
authority" if the person being arrested (detained) is "actually 
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit the offense" 
(assault) §77-7-6(2). If the Utah Supreme Court will consider this 
exception on rehearing, based on the facts of this case as set forth 
in the record, the Utah Supreme Court will conclude that whether or 
not McFarland was "engaged in the commission of or an attempt to 
commit" an assault at the time Avondet arrested (detained) him is 
an issue that must be considered and decided upon. 
If the Utah Supreme Court can rule as a matter of law that 
McFarland was "engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit 
an assault" at the time Avondet arrested (detained) him, then the 
arrest was proper. On the other hand, if the Utah Supreme Court can 
rule as a matter of law that McFarland was not "engaged in the com-
mission of or an attempt to commit an assault at the time Avondet 
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arrested (detained) him, then the arrest was improper. However, if 
the Utah Supreme Court decides that reasonable minds could differ as 
to whether or not McFarland was "engaged in the commission of or an 
at tempt to commit an assault" at the time Avondet arrested (detain-
ed) him, then the Utah Supreme Court should let the jury decide this 
issue (under a preponderance of the evidence standard and not under 
a beyond a reasonable doubt standard as imposed upon Skaggs by the 
trial court in the first trial. 
4. Even if the Utah Supreme Court was to decide as a, 
matter of law that McFarland was not "engaged in the commission of 
or an attempt to commit an assault "at the time Avondet arrested 
(detained) him, Avondet still complied with the requirements of 
§77-7-6 as to "intention, cause and authority." If this court can 
infer from the actions and statements of McFarland 
"She said I was free to go." 
"! got up and left." 
(P. 5 of Opinion.) 
McFarland's "involuntary consent (acceptance) to be released from 
defendant's custody" (p. 5 of opinion) and hence a waiver of his 
right to be taken before a magistrate pursuant to §77-7-23 Utah Cod1
1 
Annotated, 1953, surely, in all fairness and justice this court 
should infer from the actions and statements of McFarland 
She sot out her handcuffs 
t said: "ok. ok. t' 11 go hack in." 
(Record p. 95.) 
McFarland's knowledge of Avondet' s "intent ion, cause and authority 
to arrest," whi.ch under such circumstances, i.e. McFarland "actuall' 
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being engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an 
offense (the assault)," is not required under §77-7-6. 
Avondet, after being struck by McFarland, produced a set 
of handcuffs, which McFarland recognized and as a result, aborted 
the notion of further physical contact. Record, p. 93. At that 
point, McFarland was on notice of Avondet's intention to arrest. 
Undisputedly, Defendant was then taken to the manager's office. 
Record, p. 96. McFarland at least at that time, was certainly on 
notice of Avondet's authority as an employee of Skaggs and there, 
McFarland was informed by Avondet as to the cause of the arrest 
(assault). Record, p. 98. The reasonable inferences of these acts 
are adequate notice to embody the requirements of §77-7-6. There-
fore, even assuming the applicability of the formalized steps, it is 
evident that McFarland was on constructive notice of each of the 
elements as enumerated in the statute. 
This is not dissimilar from an undercover police officer, 
handcuffing, putting the arrestee in the patrol car, and informing 
him of the charges at the station. If that arrest would be valid 
under Utah law, so was Avondet's. See State v. Beard, supra. 
5. This Court remanded this case to the trial court "for 
the limited purpose of trying the issue of punitive damages under 
the newly adopted standard of actual malice." In order to decide 
this issue fairly, the jury should not be instructed that the 
Supreme Court has already decided as a matter of law that Avondet 
did not make a proper arrest because she did not advise McFarland of 
her "intention, cause and authority to arrest" and thus the jury is 
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only to decide if Avondet made this improper arrest with malice 
(intentionally) or without malice (an honest mistake or lack of 
knowledge concerning the law which a private citizen is charged witn
1 
knowing,) but instead, this court should let the jury decide them-
selves based upon all the facts as to whether or not Avondet's 
arrest of McFarland was proper or improper (i.e., if McFarland was 
"engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an assault on 
Avondet") and the jury should be able to decide this issue under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard and not under a beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard as the trial court instructed in the first 
trial, which was the primary basis for appeal in this case (the 
imposition by the trial court of a criminal standard in a civil 
trial). Thus, if the arrest was proper, award no damages; if 
improper, award compensatory damages; and if improper and malicious1 
award compensatory and punitive damages. For this court to remand 
this case for a trial on punitive damages only, can only result in 
an implication by the jury that the Supreme Court must feel that 
punitive damages are warranted in this case and the only question i~ 
the amount. 
Based upon the foregoing. Defendant/Appellant Skaggs 
respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing. 
DATED this ) . /.)-r day of February, 1984. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
I 
I /. I 
: / -. / . l i ' ~ St ePh fu:i 1 ?f .' \1o~g a~' "d ' < c _ ___,. 
I 
-
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